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Brand Loyalty in a Bertrand-Type Oligopoly 
Setting 
Demetri Kantarelis 





It appears that in today’s brand-proliferating, constantly market-segmenting 
and technologically evolving global economy, consumer perceptions affect an 
entire industry in which brand loyalty is possible such as the extremely hot 
and rapidly developing global smartphone industry. In a brand-loyalty-prone 
industry, what are the implications of brand loyalty in terms of, among oth-
ers, industry price, sales and profit? I propose a market structure in which 
each firm’s profit depends on sales of a brand realized in a captive market 
segment as well as on sales of the same brand realized in a non-captive mar-
ket segment; ignoring costs of production and assuming that all firms simul-
taneously enter into the two market segments and that price discrimination 
of the 3rd degree is not possible, I employ a Bertrand-type duopoly structure 
and then aggregate over n firms. Counterintuitively, industry price, quantity 
and profit all rise with entry. The findings are primarily due to the assumed 
entry condition (that each entrant enters into two market segments one of 
which is a monopoly) and secondarily to the inability of the sellers to price 
discriminate. I conclude that experience-type data in the smartphone indus-
try can be considered as somewhat supportive of the proposed structure and 
the derived theoretical results. 
 
Keywords 
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Segmentation 
 
1. Introduction: Literature Review, Motivation and Market  
Structure Setting 
In the last two years or so numerous published papers, especially in marketing 
and management outlets, deal with brand loyalty ranging from conceptual to 
empirical and from specific to general. All recommend that brand loyalty ought 
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to be pursued by firms because it contributes, at least for a while, to higher prof-
it. In the field of industrial organization though, especially in the sub-field of 
market structures, brand loyalty has not been incorporated into formal model-
ling; researchers in this field are complacent with location-type oligopoly models 
subject to Nash mentality (more details in Kantarelis (2020) [1], chapters 3 and 
4).  
As we march through the 4th industrial revolution, firms appear to rely more 
on brand loyalty through various business models, strategies and tactics. As 
pointed-out by Tartaglione et al. (2019) [2], brand loyalty (how consumers 
perceive a brand) is one of the hottest topics in marketing and management to-
day because loyal consumers are more profitable due to price insensitivity, lower 
needs for service, and high degree of repurchasing. Cachon (2019) [3] reasons 
that as a reaction to the way people live today, that is in an ocean of new tech-
nologies and information resources, innovations in new business models and 
strategies (for example, sharing economy models, or a never discount strategy), 
enable firms to create novelty and as a result more or less sustainable brand 
loyalty. Rutz et al. (2019) [4] focus on monetizing user engagement via in-app 
advertising and explain how publishers, when trying to monetize engagement 
of an app in a mobile platform beyond the initial download, can generate fore-
casts used as tools to identify with pinpoint accuracy potentially loyal consum-
ers. Similarly, Sayedi (2018) [5] states that real-time bidding permits promoters 
to target clients at an individual level by tracking their website surfing activity 
thorough cookies information; hence, advertisers can customize their ads for 
potentially loyal clients. Yoganarasimhan (2019) [6], enlightens us how ma-
chine-learning (with data from query-based past search by a firm’s potential 
buyers on the firm’s webpage) can lead to customer personalization as a function 
of user history and query type, leading to better understanding of consumer 
needs and their classification into more or less loyal patrons. Haddad et al. 
(2019) [7], discuss startups (specifically, new firms with the purpose of rein-
venting financial technology) and they point out the importance of loyalty pro-
grams offered by such entities such as rewards for brand loyalty or giving cus-
tomers advanced access to new products, special sales coupons, or free mer-
chandise. Suchánek et al. (2019) [8], concerned with creation of consumer loyal-
ty, clarify that purchasing implies more familiarity with the product making 
matching quality expectations with satisfaction a fundamental ingredient for the 
establishing and maintaining of loyalty. Zhang (2019) [9], points out the impor-
tance of five consumption experiences on brand loyalty (sensory, emotional, 
thinking, action and related) incorporation of which in business model contri-
butes to higher profit. Molinillo et al. (2018) [10], have succeeded in measuring 
brand success, across different product categories, based on four critical con-
structs: equity, trust, satisfaction and loyalty; among other results, they report 
that brand loyalty is positively affected by brand trust and brand satisfaction; 
they recommend that their Consumer-Based Brand Performance Model would 
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other brands. Garg et al. (2019) [11], advocate that for effective consumer seg-
mentation, more sales and higher profits, we need to think in terms of factors 
that influence brand love (such as reputation, anthropomorphisation and com-
munal orientation) and indicators of brand love (such as word of mouth, con-
sumer forgiveness, and willingness to pay higher prices). Concerned with the 
evolution of brand loyalty, Casteran et al. (2019) [12], find, among other, that 
although on aggregate and through time (over 54 categories and 6 years in 
Denmark) brand loyalty drops, significant decline was observed only for a small 
number of categories.  
It appears that in today’s brand-proliferating, constantly market-segmenting 
and technologically evolving global economy, consumer perceptions affect an 
entire industry in which brand loyalty is possible such as the extremely hot and 
rapidly developing global smartphone industry. In the paragraphs that follow, 
motivated by the arguments and findings of the above-mentioned researchers, I 
would like to address the following questions: In a brand-loyalty-prone industry, 
what are the implications of brand loyalty in terms of, among other, industry 
price, sales and profit? Can a theoretical market-structure-type model be con-
structed to include some of the key features implied above and would the mod-
el’s assertions find empirical support?  
A brand seller may encounter two types of consumers: loyal (captive) buyers 
and peripheral (non-captive) buyers. Loyal buyers are hard-core patrons who 
purchase the brand no matter what; consumer brand loyalty offers monopoly 
power to the seller because the buyer of a brand is blind to substitute brands in 
the market even though substitute brands may be less expensive, exhibit higher 
quality and/or deliver better service. Peripheral buyers, on the other hand, make 
markets competitive: they may like simultaneously several brands, develop the 
desire to move from consuming one brand to another and/or look for deals.  
Understandably, brand loyalty ought to be pursued for it may contribute to 
profit due to barriers to entry because of competitive advantage, potential for 
additional market share, client acceptance of product alterations and willingness 
to pay higher prices relative to less expensive substitutes, as well as lower cost to 
serve existing clients. As Dimitroff (2018) [13] states, “[e]xtreme loyalists keep 
buying their brands products even when they are … over-priced.” 
Of course, a brand may not turn all clients into loyal cult-like followers; some 
potential customers would choose to consider competing brands. Hence, a firm 
may find itself selling a brand, simultaneously, in a monopoly market (consisting 
of loyal-type or captive buyers) and a competitive market (consisting of peri-
pheral-type or non-captive buyers). Consider for example some brands moni-
tored by BankMyCell (2019) [14] which looked at data from 64,273 smartphone 
users to determine what percentage of users trading in their phones remained 
loyal to their current brand; as reported (bullets added),  
• Apple had 74.6% iPhone trade-in brand loyalty, with 12.8% heading to Sam-
sung, 5.3% to LG.  
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ple, 8% to LG.  
• Google had 51.0% trade-in brand loyalty, with the lowest volume heading to 
Apple at 10.1%.  
• LG, Motorola and HTC all fell below 41% brand loyalty at trade-in.  
• Only 10.8% of HTC respondents stayed loyal, with 32.1% heading to Sam-
sung, 17.1% to Apple. 
The percentages reported by BankMyCell may be considered quantitative ap-
proximations of brand captives (74.6% for iPhone and 63.9% for Galaxy) and 
therefore of brand non-captives (25.4% for iPhone and 36.1% for Galaxy); simi-
larly, for the rest of the brands in the report. I consider this reality to be justifica-
tion for each brand seller to consider, simultaneously and indiscriminately, two 
markets: the captive and the non-captive.  
In this paper, building on past work by Kantarelis (1994) [15], I would like to 
make an attempt to describe a market structure in which each firm’s profit de-
pends on sales of a brand realized in its captive market (SC) as well as on sales of 
the same brand realized in its non-captive market (SNC); ignoring costs of pro-
duction (justification later), the profit function of firm i may be stated as follows: 
πi(SCi, SNCi) where π = Profit, S = Sales, C = Captive, and NC = Non-Captive. In 
turn, assuming that all firms are identical price competitors and that price dis-
crimination of the 3rd degree is not possible, I aggregate over n firms and discuss 
some theoretical results. This paper differs from previous work in that it simpli-
fies and better explains matters and as such, I believe, it serves as a more effec-
tive pedagogical tool. 
In whatever follows, I describe a duopoly setting in Section 2. In Section 3, I 
aggregate over n firms and discuss entry implications. In Section 4, I describe 
some real-world brand loyalty cases followed by conclusion and summary in 
Section 5. 
2. Linear Duopoly Setting 
Consider price competing firms (i and j) that experience zero costs. Let P = 
market price, Q = quantity, and coefficients (α, β, γ, δ, ε) = real positive num-
bers. Sales in the C market segment may be expressed as 
( ).Ci i Ci i iS PQ P Pα β= = −                       (1) 
Sales in the NC segment may be expressed as 
( ) ( )1 1 .NCi i NCi i i jS PQ P n P n Pγ δ ε = = − + −               (2) 
when n = 1, the firm acts as a monopolist in both C and NC market segments. In 
a duopoly market structure, with n = 2, firms are assumed to follow a Ber-
trand-type mentality (for more details see Kantrarelis (2020) [1], pp. 96-102): 
each maximizes profit subject to the condition that the rival does not alter price. 
In Equation (2), the term (1/n) indicates that access to the market is split evenly 
but, because coefficients δ and ε may be unequal, firms’ market shares may differ. 
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senthal (1980) [16]). In turn, i’s profit may be expressed as the summation of (1) 
and (2), or  
( ) ( ){ } ( ) 21 1 1i Ci NCi j i iS S n n P P n Pπ α γ ε β δ = + = + + − − +         (3) 
and, similarly, j’s profit may be expressed as  
( ) ( ){ } ( ) 21 1 1 .j Cj NCj i j jS S n n P P n Pπ α γ ε β δ= + = + + − − +           (4) 
Assuming, as Bertrand requires, that the rival’s price remains constant, each 
duopolist may maximize profit with respect to its own price. Partially differen-
tiating (3) with respect to Pi and (4) with respect to Pj and setting equal to zero 
and then solving for their respective prices, firms derive their best response 
function (BRF) as follows:  
( ) ( ) ( )
( ) ( ){ } ( )
| 1 1 2 1 0
1 1 | 2 1
i i j i
i j
P n n P n P
P n n P n
ϑπ ϑ α γ ε β δ
α γ ε β δ
 = + + − − + =   
 → = + + − +   
       (5) 
( ) ( ) ( )
( ) ( ){ } ( )
| 1 1 2 1 0
1 1 | 2 1
j j i j
j i
P n n P n P
P n n P n
ϑπ ϑ α γ ε β δ
α γ ε β δ
= + + − − + =      
→ = + + − +      
      (6) 
Letting α = 100, β = 0.5, γ = 60, δ = 1.5, and ε = 1.5, the duopolists’ best re-
sponse and iso-profit functions, are graphed in Figure 1. The equilibrium solu-
tion (identical to a Nash equilibrium) may be found by solving simultaneously 
the linear system of the two response functions (5) and (6) for Pi and Pj. For the 
chosen parameter values, this equilibrium is (74.286, 74.286) and is identified 
with point e.  
Figure 2, enables one to compare the equilibrium of the proposed model (e) 
to the one of the traditional Bertrand (e') according to which, with the same pa-
rameter symbols and numerical values as those utilized in the proposed NC 
market and excluding cost, profit is  
 
 
Figure 1. Best Response Functions (BRF) and Iso-Profit Functions (π ) where, at equili-
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Figure 2. Equilibrium in the recommended model (e) and in the traditional Bertrand (e').  
 
( ) ( ) 60 1.5 1.5i i i i i j i i jPQ P P P P P Pπ γ δ ε= = − + = − + . Obviously, e' corresponds 
to lower prices and profit primarily because brand product monopoly-type gains, 
due the additional captive market segment, are not allowed in the traditional 
Bertrand model. 
3. Entry and Aggregation 
Suppose a firm enters an industry with its own brand product and it successfully 
establishes a captive (monopoly) market. Let all entering firms do the same; 
therefore, n firms would create n captive (monopoly) markets.  
Additionally, let all entering firms have access to an n-firm competitive mar-
ket in which they sell the same brand products as those they sell in their captive 
markets. Hence, in this hypothetical industry (which combines both a monopoly 
market segment and a competitive one—with no possible price discrimination), 
each entrant is assumed to be able to sell the same brand, simultaneously to two 
markets: its loyal market and in the market where it experiences competition 
from other brands. The primary question I would like to address here is, given 
this industry setting and the entry conditions as described above, what would be 
the aggregate impact of entry on industry price, quantity and profit? 
For aggregation purposes, I would like to expand upon the duopoly results es-
tablished above, since, conveniently “n” has been pre-inserted in the profit func-
tions. For equilibrium in the n-firm case, I assume that i j eP P P= = . Thus, from 
(5) or (6), 
( ) ( ){ } ( )
( ) ( ) ( )( ){ }
1 1 | 2 1
1 | 2 1 1 1
e e
e
P n n P n
P n n n n
α γ ε β δ
α γ β δ ε
= + + − +      
→ = + + − −      
          (7) 
Therefore, from i’s captive demand function and (7), Ci eQ Pα β= − . Since all 
firms are identical in terms of each having a captive market segment, then from 
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( ).Ce Ci eQ nQ n Pα β= = −                       (8) 
From i’s non-captive market demand function and (7),  
( ) ( )1 1NCi e eQ n P n Pγ δ ε= − + −   . Since all firms meet in this market segment, 
( ) ( ) ( ) 1 1 1 .NCe NCi e e eQ nQ n n P n P n Pγ δ ε γ δ ε= = − + − = − − −           (9) 
Therefore, aggregate industry quantity (QA) and profit (ΠA) are, respectively, 
( ) ( )1A Ce NCe eQ Q Q n n n Pα γ β δ ε= + = + − + − −           (10) 
and 
.A A eQ PΠ =                           (11) 
Table 1 exhibits a numerical example with 100α γ= =  and 1β δ ε= = =  
followed by three graphs based on the numerical example: Figure 3 (Pe versus n), 
Figure 4 (QA versus n), and Figure 5 (ΠA versus n). As the numerical example 
and the corresponding graphs show, Pe rises with n in a diminishing fashion 
whereas QA and ΠA rise with n exponentially. Numerical examples with different 
parameter values generated similar results; in some of these examples, when 
both δ and ε were assigned numerical values larger than 1, with all else un-
changed, higher positive prices were generated up to a higher value of n beyond 
which additional entry caused price to sharply drop below zero to rise thereafter 
with n, in a wave-like fashion approximately resembling the graph of a sawtooth 
wave function or a function such as this one: ( )1.1cos 2y x y= + −π   . 
In traditional Bertrand-type oligopoly models, entry of firms causes aggregate 
industry quantity (QA) to rise and market prices (Pe) along with aggregate profits 
(ΠA) to fall. Counterintuitively, in the segmented market structure described 
here, Pe, QA, and ΠA all rise with n, the number of entrants. These results may be  
 
Table 1. Numerical example with α = γ = 100 and β = δ = ε = 1. 
n Pe QA ΠA 
1 50.00 100.00 5000.00 
2 60.00 180.00 10,800.00 
3 66.67 266.67 17,777.78 
4 71.43 357.14 25,510.20 
5 75.00 450.00 33,750.00 
6 77.78 544.44 42,345.68 
7 80.00 640.00 51,200.00 
8 81.82 736.36 60,247.93 
9 83.33 833.33 69,444.44 
10 84.62 930.77 78,757.40 
20 91.30 1917.39 175,066.16 
40 95.35 3909.30 372,747.43 
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Figure 3. Pe versus n. 
 
 
Figure 4. QA versus n. 
 
 
Figure 5. ΠA versus n. 
 
considered reasonable since the proposed market structure consists of n mono-
polies selling to the segment of their obsessive or loyal shoppers and to a com-
petitive market segment in which they all meet and compete without the oppor-
tunity to price discriminate: if most buyers are loyal, they would not object to 
higher prices, the same prices firms also charge to those few who are less loyal.  
4. The Proposed Model vis-à-vis the Global Smartphone  
Industry 
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more. Although it sounds reasonable to assume that they sell, at the same price, 
to both loyal and non-loyal market segments and that entrants enter the way it 
was described above, perhaps none of the respective industries can readily offer 
data in support of the proposed unusual model. However, although the model 
may have some value as intellectual play its corroboration by experience-type 
data would be the ultimate test of its value.  
It appears that brand-type market structures, resembling the proposed one, 
are highly concentrated with the top firms selling brands at high prices expe-
riencing both higher sales and profit regardless of costs. Consider for instance a 
typical such industry that in the last 25 years we have all become so involved 
with and so dependent on, the smartphone industry. I would like to report below 
on how approximations to n, Pe, QA, and ΠA (the industry’s number of competi-
tors, price as well as sales and profits) evolve through time. 
• Regarding the number of competitors and growth, according to Holst (2019) 
[17], “the smartphone industry has been steadily developing and growing 
since then, both in market size, as well as in models and suppliers”; and ac-
cording to Khandelwal, Rekha (2019) [18], 
The global smartphone industry is huge and is growing rapidly. According to 
GSMA Intelligence, 80% of mobile connections globally will be smartphones by 
2025. Currently, China, India, and the US are the top three countries by number 
of smartphone connections. Though there’s a large number of smartphone 
companies, a few top players dominate the global smartphone industry … Sam-
sung, Huawei, Apple (AAPL), Xiaomi, Vivo, and Oppo control more than 75% 
of the global smartphone market. According to Gartner, five of these companies 
(excluding Vivo) account for around 63% of global smartphone sales. Four of 
the top six smartphone companies are Chinese.  
• Regarding market prices, according to Holst (2019) [17], “in 2016, smart-
phones were sold at an average price of 282 U.S. dollars worldwide ... pro-
jected to rise to 317 U.S. dollars in 2021” and according to Kastrenakes 
(2019) [19],  
[p]hones are more expensive than ever. Flagship devices from Apple, Sam-
sung, Google, and other top manufacturers can now cost hundreds of dollars 
more than they did just a couple of years ago. Now, with the arrival of foldable 
phones, which are being priced at $2000 and above, it looks like the upper limit 
for phone prices is going to keep growing. 
• Regarding sales, the number of smartphones sold to end users worldwide 
went from about 122 million units in 2007, to a 970 in 2013. According to 
Protocol Digital Marketing (2019) [20],  
[i]n 2016, the number of smartphones sold to consumers stood at around 1.5 
billion units, a significant increase from the 680 million units sold in 2012. This 
means that over 28 percent of the world’s total population owned a smart device 
in 2016, a figure that is expected to increase to 37 percent by 2020. In the same 
year smartphone penetration is set to reach 60.5 percent in North America as 
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• Regarding profit, according to Gadgets Now (2018) [21], there are 6 increa-
singly profitable smartphone firms in the industry ranked from high to low 
as follows: Apple, Samsung, Huawei, Oppo, Vivo, and Xiaomi. In more detail 
(table format added),  
 
1. Apple 
[It] continued to command lion’s share of mobile handset industry’s profits,  
capturing almost 60% share. However, the company’s profit is down from 86% in the 
same quarter last year when Samsung had to gulp up a loss due to the Galaxy Note 7 
debacle. According to Counterpoint’s research director, Neil Shah, Apple still  
generates more than $150 profit per iPhone sold and this will continue to grow into 
the holiday season quarter, buoyed by the high-price iPhone X series. 
2. Samsung 
[It] made a strong come back in the third quarter of this year with its Note 8 series, 
while Galaxy S8 series too continued to perform on par. The profit share reached 26% 
as compared to its loss during the third quarter of 2016 due to Samsung Galaxy Note 
7 recall. The South Korean company, courtesy relatively stronger demand for Note 8 
and mid-tier J series smartphones, have been able to capture almost a fourth of the 
global mobile handset industry profits. 
3. Huawei 
[It] witnessed highest profit growth of 67% YoY in Q3 2017 due to its portfolio  
expansion across price bands. Huawei’s smartphone ASP grew by 6% YoY driven by 
its Mate and P series. The company’s per unit profit is $15. 
4. Oppo 
[It] captured the fourth spot in global handset profit share, mainly driven by its  
performance in China. Oppo’s per unit profit is $14. 
5. Vivo 
The company too owes its position to the strong performance in China. Vivo’s per 
unit profit is $13. 
6. Xiaomi 
While Xiaomi has made a strong comeback with handset profit growth of 41% YoY, it 
is still behind the market leaders. For Xiaomi, offline distribution is the key to  
reaching Oppo or Huawei’s scale, but most of Xiaomi’s sales are still skewed towards 
lower-end models. Xiaomi needs premium flagship like Mi Mix 2 or Mi 6 series to 
scale and drive higher profits to offset the offline expansion costs. Xiaomi’s per unit 
profit is lower ($2) as it plays on very thin margins. 
 
Does “experience” in the smartphone industry confirm the theoretical conclu-
sions of the proposed market structure model? To some extent, yes: 
1) The entire industry is growing with sales and suppliers since more of them 
enter (it is relatively inexpensive and easy to manufacture a smartphone today) 
than exit. Thus, QA and n are both rising. 
2) Prices have been rising over time—only lately to diminish a bit. Thus, on 
average, Pe is rising. 
3) Profits of the top 6 firms are rising which, combined with more entry than 
exit, causes overall industry profits to improve. Thus, on average, ΠA is rising as 
well. 
Of course, the experience-type evidence provided here should be taken with a 
grain of salt; it ought to be considered as somewhat supportive of the proposed 
structure. Undoubtedly, to test the theoretical predictions of the model a rigor-
ous empirical model is needed such as the one utilized by Fan and Yang (2019) 
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5. Summary and Conclusion  
I proposed above a market structure in which each firm’s profit depends on sales 
of a brand realized in its captive market (SC) as well as on sales of the same brand 
realized in its non-captive market (SNC); ignoring costs of production, the profit 
function of firm i was stated as follows: πi(SCi, SNCi). In turn, assuming that all 
firms simultaneously enter into two market segments (their loyal or captive 
market and their non-loyal or competitive market) and that price discrimination 
of the 3rd degree is not possible, I employed a Bertrand-type duopoly structure 
and then aggregated over n firms to determine, counterintuitively, that industry 
price, quantity and profit all rise with entry. The findings are primarily due to 
the assumed entry condition (that each entrant enters into two market segments 
one of which is a monopoly) and secondarily to the inability of the sellers to 
price discriminate. It was reported that “experience” in the smartphone industry 
can be considered as somewhat supportive but not as confirming of the pro-
posed structure and the derived theoretical results.  
In conclusion, there are many elements missing from the proposed model in-
clusion of which, in future research, would make it both more general and rea-
listic. More specifically, as stated above, cost was not allowed to enter the model. 
Costs of some firms are very low due to direct sales (as practiced by Xiaomi and 
OnePlus) which of course contribute to consumer price insensitivity. In general, 
judging from market experience with most smartphone industry firms, it ap-
pears that cost does not play a significant role in the competition process since 
sellers routinely overcharge without loss of sales despite the fact that the rate of 
sales is diminishing in the last 2 or 3 years indicating that consumers are be-
coming more sensitive to continually rising prices, increasingly opting to keep 
their cellphones longer. 
Another missing fact from the above model is that global markets are domi-
nated by a small number of leading firms (like the six smartphone companies 
reported above) each offering numerous, more or less successful, brand versions. 
Perhaps a leadership-type oligopoly model with each seller offering many prod-
ucts would better represent reality. Additionally, a model in which sellers sell in 
many markets (not only two) with each market experiencing various degrees of 
competition would shed more light. Moreover, a more realistic model, especially 
as it applies to cellphones, ought to build in the fact that conventions in some coun-
tries differ in relation to governmental regulations, bundling, and cross-country 
functionality.  
Finally, instead of assuming linear demand functions (derived from a general 
utility function), it may be fruitful to derive more suitable demand functions 
from specific utility models that better represent industries under consideration. 
In the smartphone industry, given the abundant applications, different market 
(country) conventions and the technical peculiarities as well as uncertainties as-
sociated with quality, the work of Fan and Yang (2019) [22], as delineated in sec-
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